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ARTICLES
FUTILITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF MEDICAL
FUTILITY: SAFEGUARDING AUTONOMY AND
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
George P. Smith, II*t
I. INTRODUCTION
When medical treatment is deemed to be "futile," it frees the physician
from the moral, medical, and legal duty to provide such treatment.1
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University. Professor of Law, The
Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.
The research for this article began in December 1993 when I was a Visiting Scholar at
The Center for The Study of Society and Medicine of The College of Physicians and Sur-
geons of Columbia University in New York City. I acknowledge the kindness and general
support provided by Dr. David J. Rothman, Director of the Center, during my visit.
In July 1994, when I was a Visiting Professor at The University of Otago Faculty of Law
and Visiting Fellow at the University Bioethics Center, Dunedin, New Zealand, I com-
pleted the research and initial draft of this Article. I thank Dean J. Stuart Anderson and
Professor Peter D.G. Skegg of the Law Faculty, and Professor Alastair V. Campbell, Di-
rector of the Bioethics Research Center, for their gracious hospitality during my stay. Fi-
nally, I acknowledge with pleasure, the research and editorial assistance I received from
John E. Durkin, J.D., The Catholic University of America, Class of 1994.
With great professional admiration and respect, and in personal friendship, this article is
dedicated to two giants of the law, Dieter Giesen and Harry D. Krause. I take this oppor-
tunity also to acknowledge my profound debt of gratitude to Dieter for his monumental
treatise, International Medical Malpractice Law, a work that has not only enlightened me
and countless others professionally, but also has shaped my whole philosophy of law and
medicine.
t An overlapping, but much shorter essay, authored by Professor Smith, entitled,
"Restructuring the Principle of Medical Futility," appears in 11 J. PALLL4TrvE CARE 9
(1995).
1. Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy Jecker, Futility in Practice, 153 ARCH. IN-
TERN. MED. 437, 440 (1993) [hereinafter Futility in Practice] (stating that "overwhelming
agreement has been reached in the medical community that physicians are not required to
provide futile treatment").
A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved to be ineffe-
tive. Although there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in the
2 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:1
While most reasonable persons agree with this proposition, much disa-
greement exists as to the definition of futile treatment. and who decides
whether a given treatment is futile. This Article begins with a discussion
of various definitions of futility and distinguishes futility from other
grounds for denying medical treatment. Next, this Article examines the
issue of who decides whether a given treatment is futile and what opera-
tional guidelines may be employed to reach this conclusion. A three-
tiered decisional structure is then proposed for testing whether a given
treatment falls within the scope of these guidelines. Under the first tier,
the treating physician would have the primary responsibility of determin-
ing whether a particular treatment should be withheld on the grounds of
futility. While the physician would be under a duty not to prescribe treat-
ment deemed futile, he would be obliged to inform the patient and his
family of this decision-including the reasons for the decision. This
would allow, under the second tier, for the patient or his family to appeal
the decision to the hospital ethics committee. The third tier recognizes a
right of limited appeal to the courts. Thereafter, this Article attempts to
counter arguments contending that the doctrine of futility infringes on
patient autonomy. Finally, this Article concludes by submitting that a
uniform policy compelling the administration of futile medical treatment
is equivalent to cruel and unusual punishment and should not, therefore,
be recognized as an affirmative duty for physicians to pursue in all cases.
immediate aftermath of a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its
use once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel.
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017-18 (1983).
"[I]f a treatment is clearly futile ... there is no obligation to provide the treatment."
Nancy S. Jecker & Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Medical Futility: The Duty Not to Treat, 2
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETmIcs 151, 156 [hereinafter Medical Futility] (quoting THE
HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 19 (1987)). "CPR may be withheld, even if previously
requested by the patient, 'when efforts to resuscitate a patient are judged by the treating
physician to be futile."' Id. (quoting American Medical Association, Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Guidelines on the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265
JAMA 1868, 1870 (1991)). "Forcing physicians to provide medical interventions that are
clearly futile would undermine the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Id. (quot-
ing American Thoracic Society, Bioethics Task Force, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-
Sustaining Therapy, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 478, 478-85 (1991)). "Treatments that
offer no benefit and serve to prolong the dying period should not be employed." Id. (quot-
ing Task Force on Ethics of the Society of Critical Care Medicine, Consensus Report on the
Ethics of Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatments in the Critically Ill, 18 CRTcAL CARE MED.
1435, 1435-39 (1990)).
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II. THE NEED TO DEFINE FUTILITY
Prior to broaching an analytical discussion of the definition of futility,
an initial question must be posited: What value is to be derived from
reaching a consensus on the meaning of this word and its application as a
medical principle? Even though discussions of futility raise difficult is-
sues and require acknowledgement of the limits of health care and the
inevitability of death,2 an examination of the facts dictate that this highly
complex and sensitive issue be explored.
In the United States, approximately 1.6 million persons die in hospitals
or long term health care facilities each year.3 Approximately seventy per-
cent of these persons die as a result of someone's decision to withdraw or
withhold life-sustaining treatment.4 Physicians often make these deci-
sions without clear guidelines and without informing the patient or fam-
ily.5 As a result, extraneous factors such as race, wealth, gender, and age
of the patient, as well as judgments on the quality of the patient's life and
concerns with cost containment, may cloud a physician's determination to
withhold or withdraw treatment.6 A clear working definition of futility is
needed to ensure that physicians not only inform patients and their fami-
lies about the decision to withdraw or withhold treatment, but also to
provide the patients, their families, and the couits7 with objective criteria
against which they may judge the medical decision.8
2. Miriam P. Cotler & Dorothy R. Gregory, Futility: Is Definition the Problem?, 2
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHics 219,220 (1993).
3. See Lance K. Stell, Stopping Treatment on the Grounds of Futility: A Role for Insti-
tutional Policy, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 481, 493 (1992).
4. Id.
5. Id Dr. David Bihari, Director of the Intensive Care Unit of Guy's and St.
Thomas' Hospital in London, was rebuked by his hospital for announcing his reliance on a
computer program, termed RIP, to assist him in his clinical evaluation of whether to termi-
nate a patient's life-sustaining treatment. Nigel Hawkes, 'Doomsday' Computer Disowned
by Hospital, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1994, at 3. If the program concludes that a
patient will die within 90 days, a small black coffin with a white cross appears on the
screen. Id. Dr. Bihari confirmed that the program's predictions were wrong five percent of
the time. Id.
6. Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 438-40.
7. A precise definition of futility would provide the courts with a standard to be em-
ployed in civil and criminal proceedings. See generally Symposium on Medical Futility, 25
SETON HALL L. REV. 873 (1995) (proposing that a "serviceable construction for medical
futility be grounded in the definition of 'standard of care.").
8. Futility may be used both defensively and offensively. Edward R. Grant, Medical
Futility: Legal and Ethical Aspects, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 330,333 (1992). Futility is
defensive when a physician or hospital raises it as a defense to civil charges of malpractice
or criminal charges of homicide. Id. Futility is offensive when physicians and hospitals
employ it to deny a request for continued treatment by the patient or family. Id.
1995]
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The issue of futility sparks the most discussion when the patient is in a
persistent vegetative state ("PVS") and when the physician commands a
do not resuscitate ("DNR") order.9 A patient diagnosed as being in a
PVS has no chance of regaining consciousness or returning to a sapient
existence.1" Similarly, when a patient suffers from severe and irreversible
dementia"-meaning that he is unable to initiate any purposeful activity
and only accepts nourishment and bodily care in a helpless, passive
state-his condition could be classified as futile. The definitional scope
9. Robert D. Truog, M.D. et al., Sounding Board- The Problems with Futility, 326
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1560 (1992). In a study of 863 internists affiliated with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania (of whom 481 responded), it was found that the physicians' choice
of which life support mechanisms to withdraw was determinative of the rapidity, painless-
ness, and dignity of a patient's death. Nicholas A. Christakis & David A. Asch, Biases in
How Physicians Choose to Withdraw Life Support, 342 THE LANCET 642, 642 (1993). A
critically ill patient may be dependent on numerous life-sustaining means at any one time,
ranging from blood transfusions, kidney dialysis, intravenous drugs, artificial feeding, an-
tibiotics, and mechanical ventilation. Id. This study found that the type of support most
doctors were willing to withdraw was blood transfusion or dialysis, followed by intravenous
blood pressure drugs, intravenous feeding, antibiotics, mechanical ventilation, tube feed-
ing, and least preferred of all, intravenous fluids. Id. Internists would prefer to withdraw
treatment supporting organs that failed for natural reasons (underlying disease) or recently
instituted therapy, as opposed to treatment a patient has been receiving for long periods of
time. Id. See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHoIcES: AuToNoMY IN HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS Ch. IV (1989) (discussing "the right to a good death").
10. See Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of "Right to Die"
Case, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 511, 512 (1991) (since Helga Wanglie was in a PVS, her
doctors concluded that keeping her on a respirator was "'non-beneficial' because it would
not restore her to consciousness"). A PVS differs from a coma in that persons in a coma
have the potential to regain consciousness. Larry Maldonado, Bioethics and the Law: The
Case of Helga Wanglie: A Clash at the Bedside: Medically Futile Treatment v. Patient Au-
tonomy, 14 WHrrrMR L. REv. 129, 130 (1993).
The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS defines persistent vegetative state as a condition
that arises one month after an acute traumatic or nontraumatic brain injury, or as a condi-
tion lasting at least one month in patients with either degenerative or metabolic disorders
or developmental malformations. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects
of the Persistent Vegetative State (pt. 1), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1499 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Medical Aspects of PVS (pt. 1)]. A patient moves to a state of permanent vegetation
when, with a high degree of clinical certainty, a diagnosis is made that there is an exceed-
ingly small chance consciousness will be regained. Id. Therapy aimed at reversing the PVS
has not been successful. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the
Persistent Vegetative State (pt. 2), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1572 (1994) [hereinafter
Medical Aspects of PVS (pt. 2)].
11. Sidney H. Wanzer, M.D. et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly
Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955, 958 (1984). Dementia is not amenable to treat-
ment and is characterized by a chronic disintegration of all intellectual capacity. See id.
See generally Astrid Norberg, Ethics in the Case of The Elderly with Dementia, in PRINci-
Pt.s oF HEALTiH CARE EmIcs Ch. 61 (Raanon Guillon ed., 1994) (discussing the ethics in
the care of elderly persons with dementia).
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of futility could also include treatment for those in a deep, irreversible
coma for an extended period of time (i.e., six months to a year), as well as
those who are permanently vegetative. 2 The central point to any deter-
mination that medical treatment would be futile should be an under-
standing, if not a realization, that terminal illness should not be the sole
and necessary criterion for withholding treatment. For example, many
comatose or barely conscious patients are not terminally ill yet are in
such an irrevocable state of mental and physical deterioration-with no
realistic hope of a qualitative restoration of health-that they should be
properly classified as outside the bounds of treatment.
1 3
A DNR is ordered when a physician concludes that it is not worth the
effort to effect cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") in the event of
cardiac or respiratory arrest. 4 While the law does not prevent a physi-
cian from ordering a DNR,15 problems arise due to the absence of clear
guidelines for making the DNR decision and the fact that patients and
their families are often unaware whether and why such a decision is
12. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETrING LIMrrs: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIErY
181 (1988). When adults or children suffer from posttraumatic PVS for 12 months, recov-
ery of consciousness is unlikely. Medical Aspects of PVS (pt. 2), supra note 10, at 1572. In
cases of nontraumatic PVS occurring for three months, it is exceedingly rare for adults and
children to recover consciousness. Id. The overall life expectancy for either posttraumatic
or nontraumatic PVS range from two to five years. Id. at 1575. Moreover, when artificial
nutrition and hydration are withdrawn from PVS patients, they usually die within 10 to 14
days. Id at 1578.
13. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375, 442-43
(1988). Professor Rhoden defines reasonableness as "turning on the question of whether
the patient retains any capacity to experience and enjoy life," and would allow a physician
a right to challenge a patient or surrogate decisionmaker on the basis of reasonableness.
Id. at 432.
14. See Truog, supra note 9, at 1560. The following description of the procedure for
cardiopulmonary resuscitation is illustrative of the time and resources it requires:
If a patient goes into cardiac or respiratory arrest, the nurse in attendance causes
a notice to be broadcast on the hospital's intercommunications system giving a
code word and the room number. The members of the code team converge on
the room immediately from other parts of the hospital .... [I]f the code is broad-
cast at night, all doctors then in the hospital for whatever reason are expected to
respond to the code. [When a DNR order or] a 'no-code' order [is] entered in a
patient's medical record [, it] instructs the nursing staff, as part of the attending
physician's ongoing [patient care] instructions ... not to summon the code team
in the event [the patient suffers] cardiac or respiratory arrest.
In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 136 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (citations omitted).
15. In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d at 139. The court held that it was permissible for a
physician to write a DNR order without the prior consent of the courts. Id See generally
Paul Goulden, Non-treatment Orders, Including Do Not Resuscitate (DNR), in PRINCIPLES
oF HEALTrH CARE ETHICS Ch. 62 (Raanon Guillon ed., 1994).




This section examines many of the definitions presented in the litera-
ture and concludes that the definition offered by Lawrence Schneiderman
and Nancy Jecker offers the best working definition of medical futility.' 7
There are four general clinical uses of the futility doctrine employed in
the medical profession:18 (1) a cure is physiologically impossible;19 (2) the
treatment is nonbeneficial;20 (3) the treatment is unlikely to produce a
desired benefit;2' and (4) that the treatment is plausible, but not yet vali-
dated.' These uses of futility serve as a backdrop to the various defini-
tions of futility proposed in the literature.
A. Futility: Physiologically Impossible
Under the "physiologically impossible" definition of futility, a treat-
ment is deemed futile only "when the patient is moribund and will die
16. See Marni J. Bonnin et al., Distinct Criteria for Termination of Resuscitation in the
Out-of-Hospital Setting, 270 JAMA 1457, 1457 (1993) (identifying "distinct criteria for ap-
propriate on-scene termination of resuscitation efforts for out-of-hospital cardiac arrest
when on-scene interventions fail to restore spontaneous circulation").
The study concluded that resuscitation efforts performed on individuals suffering from
cardiac arrest meeting distinct criteria should not be performed outside a patient care facil-
ity because such treatment would be futile Id. IThe study stated that "[e]xcluding patients
with persistent ventricular fibrillation, resuscitative efforts can be terminated at the scene
when normothermic adults with unmonitored, out-of-hospital, primary cardiac arrest do
not regain spontaneous circulation within 25 minutes following standard advanced cardiac
life support." Id. The study based this conclusion on the fact that there is no benefit to
continue resuscitation efforts because, in all likelihood, the patient will not live to be dis-
charged from the hospital. Id. The authors also noted that if recommendations not to give
CPR are adhered to on a national level, $500 million per year would be saved. Id. at 1461.
17. See discussion infra Part III.D (discussing Schneiderman and Jecker's definition).
18. Steven H. Miles, Medical Futility, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 310, 310 (1992).
These uses of futility are not mutually exclusive. Id.
19. 1d.
20. Id.; see also Alfred F. Conard, Elder Choice, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 236-37
(1993) (noting the controversy over who decides the definition of futility); Nancy S. Jecker
& Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Is Dying Young Worse Than Dying Old?, 34 THE GERON-
TOLGOsIT 66 (1994) [hereinafter Dying Young] (defining a futile treatment as one in which
"the likelihood that it will in fact prolong life is exceedingly low or the quality of life
thereby gained [is] exceedingly poor").
21. Miles, supra note 18, at 310.
22. Id. See generally Tom Tomlinson & Diane Czlonka, Futility and Hospital Policy,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1995, at 28 (identifying "issues relevant to the develop-
ment of effective and defensible hospital policies supporting physician judgments not to
provide futile resuscitation").
[Vol. 12:1
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within hours or days regardless of treatment given."2 This definition is
clearly inadequate because it bars treatment only when all treatment
would undoubtedly fail. While it is not difficult to justify a decision to
withhold or withdraw treatment on such grounds, this definition of futility
does not cover many situations where withholding or withdrawing care
on the ground of futility would be justifiable. For instance, this definition
is too narrow to permit withholding or withdrawing treatment from a
body doomed to existence in a PVS. Accordingly, the "physiologically
impossible" definition of futility is inadequate.
B. Futility: Nonbeneficial or Unlikely to Produce a Benefit
The second and third uses of futility in the medical profession-that
treatment is futile if it is nonbeneficial or if it is unlikely to produce a
desired benefit-distinguish between effect and benefit. The goal of
medicine is to benefit the patient, not merely to produce a physiological
effect on the patient. 4 For example, nutritional support could have the
effect of preserving a host of organ systems in a patient but it would not
be considered a benefit because this treatment could not restore the pa-
tient to a conscious and sapient state. 5 Another example is when a doc-
tor refuses to honor a patient's demand that he be given a blood
transfusion for a simple cold. While the transfusion would certainly pro-
duce a physiological effect on the patient's body, it would not cure his
cold, and therefore, the blood transfusion would not offer him any bene-
fit. Thus, within this framework, a treatment that does not offer the pa-
tient a benefit, regardless of whether it produces an effect on the body,
should be withheld on the grounds of futility.26
23. See Cotler and Gregory, supra note 2, at 220.
24. Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implica-
tions, 112 ANNAuS INTERNAL MED. 949, 950 (1990). "Physicians should distinguish be-
tween the effect, which is limited to some part of the patient's body, and a benefit, which
the patient has the capacity to appreciate and which improves the patient as a whole."
Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 437.
25. See Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 950. The authors may, in fact, be dis-
cussing futility of life.
26. "[Al treatment that cannot provide a minimum likelihood or quality of benefit
should be regarded as futile, and such treatment is not owed to the patient as a matter of
moral duty." Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 438. Comprehensive care becomes futile
when, for example, caretakers prolong the use of artificial ventilators to treat intensive
care patients over the age of 80. Such care is also not cost effective. Researchers in upstate
New York hospitals found that when the sum of a patient's age and the number of days on
a respirator reached at least 100, the patient's chance of survival was near zero. Ian L.
Cohen et al., Mechanical Ventilation for the Elderly Patient in Intensive Care: Incremental
1 95]
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When using this distinction between effect and benefit, it is important
to note that giving comfort and palliative care to patients for whom there
is no possibility of recovery is a benefit and should not be withheld as
futile unless such treatment does not comfort or alleviate pain.27 Pallia-
tive care does not seek to cure a person's ailment or reverse a terminal
prognosis. 28  Rather, palliative care offers the benefit of alleviating or
moderating the patient's pain or discomfort and allows the patient to live
out his remaining time in dignity.
29
All uses of futility share the same goal of withholding treatment when
there is no benefit. Nonetheless, there are differences worth noting.
Withholding nonbeneficial treatment on the grounds of futility is another
way of phrasing the physician's duty not to prescribe treatment that
would harm the patient. No balancing is involved; there is merely a pro-
hibition against prescribing harmful treatment. When the physician
wishes to withhold treatment on the grounds of futility because the treat-
ment is unlikely to produce a desired benefit, however, the physician
must balance the possible harm against the possible good. 0 The factors
in the balance will not be logical absolutes, but rather statistical probabili-
Changes and Benefits, 269 JAMA 1025, 1025 (1993). Thus, a 90 year-old on a respirator for
10 days and an 85 year-old on a respirator for 15 days would have little chance of survival.
27. See Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 950.
28. See generally CICELY SAUNDERS & MARY BAINES, LIVING wrm DYINo: THE
MANAGEMENT OF TERMINAL DISEASE (2d ed. 1989) (providing that the purpose of treat-
ing "terminal disease is more than the mere absence of symptoms, it is that the patient and
his family should live to the limits of their potential").
29. See generally Balfour M. Mount, Palliative Care of the Dying, in CARE FOR THE
DYING AND THE BEREAVED 17 (Ian Gentles ed., 1982) (providing that palliative care is
different from customary patient care programs in that "there is concern for the family and
other loved ones as well as the patient"); Mary Baines, Tackling Total Pain, in Hospice
AND PALLIATIVE CARE AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 26 (Dame C. Saunders OM,
DBE, FRCP, ed., 1990) (providing "a plan of treatment for the individual patient who
complains of severe pain").
30. Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 438. The balancing of probabilities is evident in
Lance K. Stell's definition of futility:
When any intervention, including those that are life-sustaining, (a) fails to hold a
reasonable promise for bringing about the patient's recovery as verified by cur-
rent medical knowledge and experience, (b) imposes burdens grossly dispropor-
tionate to any expectable patient benefit, (c) plays no effective role in mitigating
the patient's discomfort, and (d) serves only to artificially postpone the moment
of the patient's death by sustaining, supplanting or restoring a vital function, then
the intervention is medically futile and there is no obligation to offer to initiate it,
or to offer to continue it.
Stell, supra note 3, at 495. Note that the author employs the word "reasonable" in describ-
ing the promise for discovery and the word "disproportionate" when comparing the possi-
ble burden to the possible benefit.
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ties of success or harm derived through experimentation and analysis of
hospital data.31 "Futility refers to an expression of success that is either
predictably or empirically so unlikely that its exact probability is often
incalculable."32 Medicine is a science but not an exact science. Thus, by
limiting futility to instances when it can be stated to a logical certainty
that the treatment will be more harmful than beneficial would unduly
restrict its usefulness.
C. Futility: Plausible But Not Validated Treatment
The last use of futility describes the situation when the treatment has
not been validated as an appropriate treatment for a given diagnosis.
This, however, is not an appropriate ground for withholding treatment.
In fact, such experimentation, where there is a reasonable likelihood of
success, should be encouraged. In prescribing a treatment that has not
yet been validated, however, the physician should inform the patient that
the patient is, in essence, the subject of an experiment and follow the
appropriate procedures of medical experimentation.33 Where there is a
plausible likelihood that the treatment could benefit the patient, experi-
mentation and documentation should be encouraged so the physician
could assess whether the treatment was futile or not.
D. Futility: The Schneiderman and Jecker Proposal
Lawrence Schneiderman and Nancy Jecker have proposed the best
working definition of futility. According to these authors, futility may be
The same type of balancing is evident in J. Chris Hackler and F. Charles Hiller's defini-
tion of futility:
[Physicians should be able] to write ... do-not-resuscitate order[s] over family
objections when (1) the patient lacks decision-making capacity, (2) the burdens of
treatment clearly outweigh the benefits, (3) the surrogate does not give an appro-
priate reason in terms of patient values, preferences, or best interests, and (4) the
physician has made serious efforts to communicate with the family and to mediate
the disagreement.
J. Chris Hackler, PhD & F. Charles Hiller, MD, Family Consent to Orders Not to Resusci-
tare: Reconsidering Hospital Policy, 264 JAMA 1281 (1990). But see Tom Tomlinson, PhD
& Howard Brady, MD, PhD, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264 JAMA 1276,1280
(1990) (advocating a multilevel dialogue which stresses shared powers for enhancing a pa-
tient's understanding of the limits of medical intervention by eliminating the consent pro-
cess for futile acts of CPR).
31. See Miles, supra note 18, at 311.
32. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 950. For example, a miracle does not rid the
act of its futility because by its very nature a miracle is a rare exception that defies the
odds. Id. at 951.
33. See discussion infra part III.F (explaining why experimentation is not futility).
1995]
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defined both quantitatively and qualitatively. Under their definition, if
the treatment is either quantitatively or qualitatively futile, no duty exists
for a physician to administer it.' The authors' criteria for determining
both quantitative and qualitative futility is examined below.
The quantitative definition focuses on the probability that an interven-
tion will effectuate a particular outcome and assesses whether that
probability falls below a minimum threshold."5 A recent study in the
New England Journal of Medicine, for example, calls for withholding ag-
gressive resuscitation of infants born at less than twenty-five weeks gesta-
tion.36 Through studying the mortality and morbidity of preterm infants,
researchers found that all twenty infants in their study born at twenty-two
weeks gestation did not survive to hospital discharge, while thirty-one out
of thirty-nine infants born at twenty-five weeks did survive to hospital
discharge.3 7 While aggressive interventions kept the infants born at
twenty-two weeks alive for up to four months, the results show that the
doctors were only prolonging imminent death.38 The authors could find
no justification for prolonging the death of these infants beyond a few
hours to permit the parents to say goodbye.3 9 In essence, the study con-
cluded that treating preterm infants born at twenty-two weeks is futile
because there is no chance they will ever be viable.40
Until July 1, 1993, the therapeutic treatment of children born with
anencephaly (without a brain) would have been universally acknowl-
34. See Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 951. There are two central criticisms of
this approach. First, what values do physician's use in determining whether to meet a pa-
tient's demand to continue or discontinue treatment. Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility,
Medical Necessity: The-Problem-Without-A-Name, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug.
1991, at 30, 32. Callahan suggests that the political system should decide which values
physicians should consider in this decision. Id The second criticism is that the authors
have no justification for arriving at the arbitrary quantitative number. Id. at 31.
35. Nancy S. Jecker & Robert A. Pearlman, Medical Futility: Who Decides?, 152
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1140, 1140 (1992). Although the term quantitative implies that
a futility decision based on quantitative considerations is value-free, such decisions actually
involve value choices. Id. For example, what levels of confidence are to be used in reach-
ing conclusions and what justifies the minimum threshold. Id
36. Marilee C. Allen et al., The Limit of Viability-Neonatal Outcome of Infants Born at
22 to 25 Weeks' Gestation, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1597, 1597 (1993).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1599.
39. Id.
40. See id. Other futile conditions for infants include gross paralysis with a neurologic
segmental level; gross congenital defects such as cyanotic heart disease (cardiac malforma-
tion causing insufficient oxygen to the blood); intracranial birth injury; and gross
hydrocephalus. See George P. Smith, II, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or
Apotheosis, 63 NEB. L. REv. 709, 726, 729 (1984).
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edged in the medical community as the "paradigm case of futile treat-
ment" simply because the higher brain is irreplaceable and death occurs
shortly after birth. 1 On that date, however, an unsophisticated federal
district court in Virginia42 held, and was later affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,4 3 that such an infant was
protected by federal law' and consequently entitled to ventilator resusci-
tation whenever she would suffer episodes of respiratory distress.45 The
controlling medical condition for the court was not anencephaly, but in-
termittent breathing difficulties.
In search of a quantitative definition of futility, Schneiderman and
41. John C. Fletcher, The Baby K Case: Ethical and Legal Considerations of Disputes
about Futility, 11 BIoLAw S:219, S:223 (1994).
42. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.
1994).
43. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598.
44. The court found that the principle controlling law was The Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), which requires hospitals to provide stabi-
lizing treatment to patients who present an emergency medical condition. ld. at 597. Sta-
bilizing Baby K was found to be mandated regardless of the fact that her underlying
condition limited her life expectancy and her quality of life. Id. Furthermore, the court
found that EMTALA requires physicians to provide stabilizing treatment regardless
whether they consider it morally and ethically inappropriate. Id. The court held that EM-
TALA does not create an exemption from treatment for anencephalic infants, comatose
patients, cancer patients, or others similarly afflicted by chronic conditions affecting quan-
tity and quality of life--"all of whom may repeatedly seek emergency stabilizing treatment
for respiratory distress and also possess an underlying medical condition that severely af-
fects their quality of life and ultimately may result in their death." Id. at 598.
The district court concluded that Baby K was a "handicapped" and "disabled" person
within the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
The court further stated that anencephaly was also a "disability" within the meaning of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. at 1028. The ADA "prohibits discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals by 'public accommodations."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182 (Supp. V 1993)). The court found the infant's lack of cerebral functioning pre-
vented it from walking and from seeing. Id.
45. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit limited itself
solely to whether EMTALA was the dispositive legislation. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592
n.2.
In dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse observed, with wise clarity, that EMTALA was
designed to correct hospital "dumping" of indigent or uninsured emergency patients and to
extend it to include other hospital patient relationships, as here, would be totally inconsis-
tent with the meaning and spirit of EMTALA. Id. at 598; see also George J. Annas, Asking
the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care-The Case of Baby K, 330 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1542 (1994) (criticizing a merger of legal requirements, ethical guidelines, and medi-
cal standards by attending physicians on the case and the primary hospital). See generally
Erik Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 449 (1994) (discussing the apparent ineffectiveness of state and federal antidump-
ing laws).
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Jecker concluded that if in the last 100 cases a given treatment for a given
condition has proved to be useless, it is futile, and therefore, need not be
administered.' While the authors offer little support for deciding on the
number 100, any number would inevitably be arbitrary. The number 100,
however, seems reasonable because it is a sufficient quantity to discount
any unknown variables. Record keeping in all cases is encouraged so that
treatments that offer no relief in over 100 cases may be deemed futile and
need no longer be prescribed.47 Withholding treatment that is plausible,
but not yet validated, is rejected implicitly in this construct because a
treatment is not to be deemed quantitatively futile until it has been tried
at least 100 times and has failed every time.
Schneiderman and Jecker also offer a definition of qualitative futility:
"[A]ny treatment that merely preserves permanent unconsciousness or
that fails to end total dependence on intensive medical care" is qualita-
tively futile and should be withheld.' For an individual who has no
chance of regaining consciousness, any treatment that merely sustains life
would be quantitatively futile, and thus, withheld. The scope of the
Schneiderman and Jecker definition is appropriately narrow with the pri-
mary focus being the person in a PVS. The quality of life of a person in a
PVS is minimal, if it exists at all. By virtue of the diagnosis, there is no
chance of recovery. Keeping that person from his destiny and depriving
him of a right to die with dignity does not in any way further the goals of
medicine.
It is impossible to discuss qualitative futility without discussing quality
of life. 19 However, extra care should be given to ensure that decisions of
qualitative futility do not extend beyond the limited definition offered
46. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 951. To require otherwise would demand
that physician supply a placebo. Id at 952. Anecdotal evidence of miracles must be
viewed with caution. IM
47. See id
48. Id at 952. The authors do not advocate that all qualitative decisions be made
unilaterally by physicians; rather, only those on the far end of the continuum, such as "con-
tinued biologic life without conscious autonomy," "conditions requiring constant monitor-
ing, ventilatory support, and intensive care nursing," and "conditions associated with
overwhelming suffering for a predictably brief time." Id.
When discussing qualitative futility, the decision that a treatment is futile must not be
confused with the decision that a patient's life is futile. Grant, supra note 8, at 331. Nor
should futility be used to justify withholding treatment from the aged and severely dis-
abled. Id. A futility decision should "give low order consideration to any assessment of
quality of life that is not closely dependent upon the clinical situation." Id. at 334. While
common sense dictates that many decisions will inevitably factor in quality of life, the
greatest care should be taken to minimize it. Id.
49. Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 35, at 1140.
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above. For instance, qualitative futility should not be invoked to justify
not performing curative eye surgery merely because the patient has
Down's syndrome. Such quality of life decisions are inappropriate for the
medical profession to make. If it is possible to restore the patient to a
sapient state or free the patient from total dependence on medical care,
the physician has a duty to offer the treatment because that treatment
would benefit the person regardless of the existence of a handicap or
other disability.
E. Futility: What Futility Is Not
When discussing medical futility, it is necessary to discuss what medical
futility is not. Medical futility is not an act that is impossible to per-
form."0 It may be entirely possible that a physician has both the technol-
ogy and skill to perform CPR, yet rightly refuses to do so on the ground
that such treatment is futile."1 A given treatment is also not futile merely
because it would subject the patient to extreme pain and a lengthy recov-
ery;52 nor is a treatment futile if it leaves the patient with a severe mental
or physical handicap53 because the patient or his family, rather than the
physician, should have the right to balance the possible harm and good of
such a course of action. Allowing a physician to withhold treatment if it
is possible or even probable that the patient will be mentally or physically
handicapped as a result of such treatment empowers the physician to
make quality of life determinations that too greatly infringe on the pa-
50. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 950.
51. In a 1992 study of the practices of internal medicine residents at the University of
Washington and the Seattle Veterans Affairs Medical Center, it was found that the medical
standards used to determine the cutoff points for quantitative futility and qualitative futil-
ity were erratic. J. Randall Curtis et al., Use of the Medical Futility Rationale in Do-Not-
Attempt-Resuscitation Orders, 273 JAMA 124 (1995). Accordingly, one-third of the physi-
cians in the study wrote DNR orders for patients they thought had a five percent or greater
chance of survival. Id Several patients estimated to have a 20% or better chance were
also excluded from any consideration of resuscitation. Id. In one-third of the 145 cases in
this study, the decision to issue a DNR order was made unilaterally by the physician with-
out consulting the patient or family member. Id. In these cases, quality of life was the
rationale for the issuance of the DNR order. Id, The conclusion of this study was not to
restrict DNR orders to patients with a one percent or less chance of survival, but rather to
have physicians seek greater candor in their relationships with their patients, thereby en-
abling them to discuss the odds of survival and their predicted quality of life and then seek
a mutual agreement on what course of action to follow. Id
52. Merely because a treatment may result in "frequent hospitalization, confinement
to a nursing home, or severe physical or mental handicaps" does not make that treatment
futile. Medical Futility, supra note 1, at 156-57.
53. Id
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tient's autonomy. The quality of life decisions made by the physician
should be limited to those where there is no reasonable probability that
the patient will regain consciousness or when there is no chance that the
therapeutic treatment will enable the patient to be free from total depen-
dence on intensive medical care.
The principle of futility must not be used to mask prejudice, such as a
refusal to treat an HIV-positive patient for fear of contracting AIDS.54
Futility is not hopelessness. Hopelessness is a subjective determination
that the patient will not recover; futility is an objective determination that
there is low probability of recovery.55 It is logically consistent for a pa-
tient to give up hope that a given treatment will be effective when medi-
cal data indicates that it will. It is also logical that a patient will still have
hope that a given treatment will work despite all medical data indicating
otherwise. However, futility should not be rejected in hopes of a mira-
cle 5 6-for to do so would carve an exception out of the futility doctrine
capable of engulfing the entire theory.
F. Medical Experimentation
Futility must also be distinguished from medical experimentation.
Under normal situations, if a treatment is deemed futile a physician is
under a duty not to administer it.57 Nonetheless, if the physician wants to
administer the treatment for experimental reasons, he must obtain in-
formed consent from the patient "to [administer] therapy of no proven
benefit [to the patient] with the hope of possibly benefiting [the patient],
while serving to advance knowledge in a systematic way.""8 While exper-
imentation should be encouraged to determine which treatments actually
benefit patients, a physician must exercise extreme caution when choos-
54. Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 438. A physician should not mask her fear of
performing surgery on an HIV-positive patient with the doctrine of futility. The fact that a
patient is HIV-positive does not justify withholding treatment because the latent period
from infection to full blown AIDS is usually ten years. Id. Moreover, the medical profes-
sion dictates that physicians have a duty not to discriminate against patients solely on the
basis of their HIV status. Medical Futility, supra note 1, at 153.
55. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 950.
56. See Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 439-40; Schneiderman et al., supra note 24,
at 951.
57. See discussion infra part VI (considering the physician's duty not to provide futile
treatment).
58. Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 439. The important thing to note here is the
role of the patient in the process. The physician has no right to unilaterally decide to
conduct an experiment on the patient using futile treatment. Such experimentation cannot
be performed without informed consent.
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ing this path and should place particular emphasis on the minimal likeli-
hood that such treatment will directly benefit the patient.59 To do
otherwise would jeopardize the patient's autonomy.
G. Rationing
Medical futility is often confused with resource allocation or rationing,
even though they differ significantly. When a given treatment is deemed
to be futile, the implication is that it has no therapeutic benefit.60 Futility
decisions do not rest on the fact that there are scarce resources.61 Ration-
ing, however, implies that the treatment may provide a therapeutic bene-
fit, but concerns of cost and allocation of limited resources dictate that
the treatment not be given.62
It is clear that physicians should not make bedside decisions to with-
hold or withdraw treatment based on the allocation of scarce resources.
Given that the United States has no universally accepted system for re-
source allocation,63 there is "no guarantee that any limits a[n] [individual]
physician imposes on his or her patients will be equitably shared by other
physicians and patients in the same circumstances."'  In other words,
there are no guarantees that foregoing treatment on one patient will re-
sult in another patient receiving medical services.6' Thus, physicians
should not make bedside allocation decisions by cloaking them in the veil
of futility.
The impropriety of making bedside allocation decisions when deter-
mining whether or not to withhold or withdraw treatment does not man-
date that the futility of a given treatment should not be considered when
resource allocation is determined on a macro level away from the bed-
side.66 For instance, there are at least 10,000 people in a PVS in the
59. See discussion infra parts VI.A-B (considering the dangers of offering patients fu-
tile treatment).
60. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 952-53.
61. Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 35, at 1143.44; Schneiderman et al., supra note 24,
at 953.
62. Futility in Practice, supra note 1, at 438. This does not imply that futility should not
be considered in a health care system where rationing is explicit.
63. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 953.
64. Idt
65. Idt
66. Ronald Cranford & Lawrence Gostin, Futility: A Concept in Search of a Definition,
20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 307, 308 (1992). While the harsh reality of reallocating
health care resources may very well be a valid reason for society to reconsider its willing-
ness to pay for futile treatments for dying patients, it is not regarded as a valid criteria for a
physician to consider in reaching a determination that treatments for a particular dying
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United States today. 67 Each of these persons cost the federal government
anywhere from $80,000 to $150,000 per year to maintain.68 Accordingly,
this country is spending over one billion dollars per year to preserve
human beings for whom there is no chance of recovery.69 Assuming that
the United States will eventually turn to explicit resource allocation, un-
doubtedly this expense would be questioned. It would not be unjustifi-
able to base resource allocation decisions on the potential success of the
treatment,70 rather than social status, gender, race, or ability to pay. The
fears of the "slippery slope"' 71 associated with bedside resource allocation
patient are, indeed, futile. Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determi-
nation for the Critically Ill, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 23, 75 (1993).
67. Callahan, supra note 34, at 35.
68. Id.
69. Although exact figures are not available regarding the financial savings to be ef-
fected from adopting policies that futile treatment be withheld or withdrawn, it is esti-
mated that "tens and probably scores of billions of dollars" would be saved annually.
Hospitals Establish Policies to Limit Futile Care, Hosp. ETmIcs, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 10, 10
(quoting JAMA Editor George D. Lundeberg, M.D.). Close to one-third of the annual
Medicare budget goes to caring for elderly patients in the last year of their lives. Diane
Granat, Judgment Days: Sometimes the Hardest Decisions in a Hospital are When to Give
Up and Say Goodbye, WASHNMGTONIAN, July 1993, at 54, 71.
Interestingly, in 1992, of the $809 billion spent for health care in the United States, $62
billion went for intensive care unit ("ICU") services. Joan M. Teno et al., Prognosis-Based
Futility Guidelines: Does Anyone Win?, 42 J. AM. GERATRICS Soc'y 1202, 1206 (1994).
70. Although rationing may be a painful decisionmaking process, a consideration of
the potential rehabilitative success of treatment is considered by some to be a more ethi-
cally acceptable focus than other factors such as social worth or ability to pay. Stuart J.
Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094, 2095 (1988). In a study of 4,301 pa-
tients, 115 of whom had an estimated 1% chance of surviving for 2 months, and thus, were
subjected to a "prognosis-based futility guideline," it was found that modest economic sav-
ings would accrue if 3 types of life-sustaining treatments (ventilation, kidney dialysis, and
drug medications to maintain blood pressure) were removed from these patients until they
died. Teno et al., supra note 69, at 1204-05. The reason for this was that even after receiv-
ing the treatments their physicians prescribed for them, the patients were so ill that 99 of
the 115 died within 5 days after entering the hospital. Id at 1202. In fact, only one sur-
vived beyond two months. Id The study indicated that up to $5 million could be saved if
these 3 treatments were not offered to those who had only a 10% chance of surviving for 2
months. Id at 1204-05.
71. Dismay over the unethical slippery slope becomes manifest when it is realized that
high priced life-supports, if allowed, can be withdrawn from patients who will never be
sentient. Angell, supra note 10, at 512. The fear expressed in this statement is that physi-
cians would be uncontrolled in their ability to dispense resources and that they might be
guided by prejudice. This fear is greatly mitigated, however, when resource allocation de-
cisions are made away from the bedside in a public forum where all members of society can
voice their opinions. There is, nonetheless, a concern that futility may be abused as a cost
control tool imposed by the government or health care payers. Grant, supra note 8, at 331.
While there is always potential for abuse in any system, there would be less abuse when the
standards for withholding or withdrawing treatment are arrived at through public debate,
Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility
decisions are greatly mitigated when such determinations are made by
society on a macro level. Thus, while great care should be taken not to
confuse futility with bedside rationing, the futility of a treatment should
be considered when and if this country turns to explicit health care ra-
tioning. The nation needs a clear working definition of futility that does
not confuse futility with impossibility, hopelessness, experimentation,
prejudice, or bedside resource allocation. Until such a definition is
adopted, the medical profession will be greatly hampered, if not totally
frustrated, when confronted with a patient in a futile condition.
IV. WHO DECIDES?
There are two questions within the debate over who decides whether a
given treatment is futile: (1) Who decides the objective standard of futil-
ity?; and (2) Who then will make the actual bedside decision to withhold
treatment based on the objective criteria?
A. Who Determines the Objective Standards?
Objective standards of futility should, ideally, be decided in the public
forum.72 The medical profession, perhaps through the American Medical
Association, should initiate the process by proposing guidelines to spark
discussion of this important issue. Once the medical profession presents
a proposal, society would have an opportunity to voice their opinions
through their elected officials.73 State legislatures and Congress would
either accept the guidelines as proposed by the medical profession or with
modifications expressed by their constituencies. Either way, the United
States would have standards of futility determined through a democratic
process that, at least in accepted theory, represents the social values of
the nation. The difficult and elusive nature of futility would dictate that
these standards be reasonably flexible.
B. Who Makes the "Bedside" Decision?
Once objective criteria for what constitutes futile treatment have been
established, a three-tiered decisional and appeal structure should be es-
where those ideas can be challenged through and enforced by the courts rather than when
individual physicians make ad hoc bedside determinations of futility.
72. A broad consensus among health care professionals and others should be sought in
reaching definitions of futility. Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 35, at 1140.
73. Although a definition of futility may be proposed by the medical profession, it is
society that ultimately accepts or rejects such a proposal. Futility in Practice, supra note 1,
at 437.
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tablished. The treating physician would have the primary responsibility
for determining when to withhold treatment on the grounds of medical
futility. Once that decision is made, the patient, the patient's family, or
both would have the right to a de novo appeal to the hospital ethics com-
mittee. If the party is not satisfied with the decision of the ethics commit-
tee, a limited appeal could be taken to the judicial system.
The physician would have the primary responsibility for determining
whether a given situation calls for withholding or withdrawing care on the
ground that it falls within the established guidelines.74 The physician's
expertise in the field of medicine and his intimate knowledge of the pa-
tient favor the physician as the ideal primary decisionmaker.
Some argue that the patient or family should be able to decide when
treatment is futile.75 However, placing the decision with the physician
would actually avoid unnecessary suffering for the patient and family.
76
The physician is trained to make such decisions and is further insulated
from the emotional burdens of the patient or family which may make
such a decision more difficult or impossible."
The fact that a physician is responsible for making the primary futility
decision does not free him from his duty to inform the patient. While
some authors argue that futility removes both the duty to treat and the
duty to inform,78 preclusion of a duty to inform infringes too greatly on
74. Jecker & Peariman, supra note 35, at 1140. But see Hawkes, supra note 5, at 3
(regarding Dr. Bihari's computerization of futility decisions).
75. See Giles R. Scofield, fs Consent Useful When Resuscitation Isn't?, HASnNGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 28. See generally Ann M. Massie, Withdrawal of Treat-
ment for Minors in a Persistent Vegetative State: Parents Should Decide, 35 AMz. L. REv.
173 (1993) (providing that "parents who act in good faith on the grounds of confirmed
medical diagnoses should be permitted to make termination-of-treatment decisions for
their PVS minor children without governmental involvement").
76. Physicians would avoid causing unnecessary patient suffering and placing unfair
burdens of guilt on surrogate decisionmakers if they, themselves, acted unilaterally.
Youngner, supra note 70, at 2094 (citing Donald I. Murphy, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders:
Tune for Reappraisal in Long-Term-Care Institutions, 260 JAMA 2098 (1988)). Dr. Mur-
phy decided that, instead of asking the patient or the family whether they would like
"everything possible" done to save the patient's life, he would speak frankly and relate the
actual poor prognoses, accurate descriptions of the patient's medical condition, and the
"grisly realities of dying in a critical care unit." Murphy, supra, at 2099. His results re-
vealed that 23 out of 24 patients opposed resuscitation. Id.
77. To place matters for which a competent physician is trained into the hands of lay-
men, particularly those issues that carry high emotional burdens, is a serious misordering
of priorities. Grant, supra note 8, at 331.
78. Stuart J. Youngner, Futility in Context, 264 JAMA 1295, 1295 (1990). Not all pro-
ponents of futility would require physicians to inform the family of a DNR order. For
example, one proposal argues that "when resuscitation would clearly provide no medical
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patient autonomy.79 Informing the patient and his family of the decision
not to administer treatment on the grounds of futility helps patients and
families cope with the inevitability of death, 0 and permits them to seek a
second opinion or alternative medical care."1 Moreover, informing the
patient and documenting that decision makes the physician accountable'
for futility decisions negligently made and those decisions not carefully
documented8 3 To adequately protect patients' rights, the physician must
be under a duty to inform the patient of the decision to withhold or with-
draw treatment on the grounds of medical futility.
When a physician charged with the duty of making the primary futility
decision informs a patient and family that such treatment will be withheld
or withdrawn, he must also inform the patient and family of their right to
appeal the decision. In the construct proposed, the physician must inform
the patient and family that they have a right to a de novo review of the
physician's primary decision with the hospital ethics committee. In this
proceeding, the physician would present his case and the patient and fam-
ily would present theirs. The ethics committee would then discuss the
issues and provide a written decision stating the grounds for their deci-
sion. If the ethics committee decided in favor of the primary physician,
the patient and family could then turn to the courts for relief.1
benefit to the patient, policy should not require that [the DNR] be discussed with either
the patient or the family." Hackler & Hiller, supra note 30, at 1281.
79. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIoEnTIcs AND THE LAW 88 (1993). "[T]his veil of silence
often robs the patient of his right of self-determination." Id. at 88; see also Jecker & Pearl-
man, supra note 35, at 1144 (providing that futility standards should "reflect the consent of
the various parties who are subject to them").
80. Youngner, supra note 78, at 1296.
81. Stell, supra note 3, at 493.
82. Youngner, supra note 78, at 1295.
83. Stell, supra note 3, at 493.
84. It should be realized, however, that reaching a consensus among ethicists is consid-
ered, by some, not to be a realistic goal. Rather, the real "value of an ethics consultation
lies as much in its reconciliatory process as in its prescriptive content." Ellen Fox & Carol
Stocking, Ethics Consultants' Recommendations for Life Prolonging Treatment of Patients
in a Persistent Vegetative State, 270 JAMA 2578, 2582 (1993). For example, in evaluating
cases of patients in PVSs, it has been found that medical strategies derive "more or less
[from] formalized opinions based on bodies of knowledge composed of several overlapping
and potentially contradictory sources (eg, peer-reviewed literature, recognized experts,
professional organizations, and textbooks)." Id. See generally Teodoro F. Dagi, The Ethi-
cal Tribunal in Medicine, in 1 ETHicAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE
NEw WoRLD 201-10 (George P. Smith, II, ed., 1982) (discussing the ethical problems aris-
ing from the availability of advanced medical technology in the context of the limits of
medical epistemology); George P. Smith, II, The Ethics of Ethics Committees, 6 J. CON-
TEMP. H A. L. & POL'Y 157 (1990) (providing that the decision to terminate medical
care is an ethical decision, rather than a medical decision).
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The parties could only appeal, however, limited issues in the judicial
system.85 The courts, guided by the social policy established by legisla-
tures and administrative agencies, would be restricted to determining
whether the decision to withdraw or withhold treatment was reasonable
in light of established social policy guidelines such as those offered by
Schneiderman and Jecker. If the physician's determination of futility was
reasonable, the treatment would be withheld or withdrawn.
V. MEDICAL FUTILITY V. PATIENT AUTONoMY: A TRUE BATrLE?
The debate over medical futility has increased over the years with the
expansion of patient autonomy.86 Thirty years ago, there was no need for
this debate because technology had not given physicians the tools to pro-
vide many treatments that are available today and because few patients
questioned their doctors' orders.87 As the role of the patient increases in
choosing care, so does the debate surrounding futile care. It might be
85. At least one court has indicated that it would not limit an appeal to the issues
proposed in this Article. Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. 1982). The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the Juvenile Court's order continuing a "no code"
for an infant in intensive care by making a de novo review of the case. Id. at 611. The child
had been abandoned by her parents and had become a ward of the state. Id. at 602. The
court appointed a guardian ad litem and counsel for the child. Id. Because of the child's
condition, the hospital sought a "no code" order. Id. Neither counsel nor the guardian
would give consent. Id. The Juvenile Court granted the hospital's petition and ordered the
"no code." Id. at 603. The Supreme Judicial Court requested the appeal on its own mo-
tion. Id. In the meantime, all parties came to agree that the "no code" should be issued.
I4 at 608. However, the court ruled that "the fact that the parties to the legal proceeding
previously initiated come to agreement, while it is to be given some deference, neither
defeats the jurisdiction of the court in a case such as this nor binds it to accept their posi-
tion." Id. The court noted six factors justifying its order issuing the "no code":
(1) The child is a ward of the State in the custody of the DSS; (2) the child's
mental faculties have not developed to the point where he is competent to make
the decision; (3) the parents have failed to exercise their parental responsibilities
toward the child; (4) the child's condition is incurable and the prognosis for suc-
cessful treatment is negative; (5) medical opinion on diagnosis and prognosis was
clear and unanimous as to the child's condition and future; (6) attempts to resus-
citate would be painful and intrusive.
Id
86. Nonetheless, futility is not a new issue for the courts. Over 40 years ago, in Dallas
Railway & Terminal Co. v. Guthrie, 206 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 1947), the court denied
plaintiff's prayer for future medical expenses based on testimony that the medical profes-
sion could do nothing for the plaintiff but give him "comfort and strength." Id. at 645.
Arguably, the court thereby accepted the notion of futility by denying recovery for future
treatment that would give the patient no benefit.
87. Boozang, supra note 66, at 63-64. Before the relatively modem acceptance of the
principle of self-determination and the validity of informed consent, the doctor-patient
relationship was one in which the dominant decisionmaker was the physician and the pa-
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suggested that futility is the point at which to draw the line on the ad-
vancement of patient autonomy. This is not necessary, however, because
the goals of patient autonomy and cessation of futile treatment are not
inconsistent. Patient autonomy does not convey the right to demand fu-
tile treatment. In effect, offering or administering futile treatment under-
mines patient autonomy by raising false expectations of recovery.
Patient autonomy includes the right to be a fully informed participant
in every aspect of the medical decisionmaking process, as well as the right
to refuse medically prescribed lifesaving treatment.' Thus, patient rights
of autonomy or self-determination are abridged, not when there is a de-
nial of opportunities to make any medical decision, but rather when there
is a denial of an opportunity to make "a rightful medical decision."89 Pa-
tient autonomy does not give the patient the right to demand futile treat-
ment because this is not a rightful medical decision. The patient does not
have a right to the treatment because it has been determined that the
treatment is not warranted for persons in his condition. The patient does
not have a right to opt out of the class to which his medical condition
relegates him.
Patient autonomy gives rise to a negative right rather than a positive
right-for the patient has a right to refuse a given treatment but not a
corresponding right to demand a given treatment.9" Once it has been
determined what is futile, a patient's autonomy is not invaded or sacri-
tient was an obedient party. Id. See generally JAY KATZ, THm SILENT WORLD OF DocroR
AND PATIENT (1984) (discussing the history of informed consent).
Of course, it is realized that, due to man's communal or interdependent nature, he is
never totally free to make independent choices and be truly autonomous. Bruce J. Winick,
On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 ViL.. L. REv. 1705, 1769 (1992).
As a component of several social groups (e.g., family, workplace, various associations and
interest groups, and the community itself), an individual's choice is constrained by a variety
of social, economic, psychological, religious and familial pressures from these groups. Id
at 1768. Thus, acts of self-determination become influenced or even dependent upon the
various desires of these groups and to the anticipated impact such individual expressions
will have upon them. Id at 1769. See generally William M. Altman et al., Autonomy,
Competence and Informed Consent in Long Term Care: Legal and Psychological Perspec-
tives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1671 (1992) (discussing the application of psychological perspectives
on autonomy and competency to the legal doctrine of informed consent to facilitate auton-
omous decisionmaking among elderly nursing home residents).
88. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 949.
89. Jecker & Pearlman, supra note 35, at 1142. The author cites as an example that a
physician is not obligated to honor a patient's request for a liver when other patients have
prior claims to that scarce resource. Id
90. Stell, supra note 3, at 484. For example, a physician would not be obligated to
honor a patient's request for magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") for complaints of a
bump on their head. Id.
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ficed if the physician does not honor the request for such treatment be-
cause patients are simply not entitled to futile treatment. 91 The
physician, by virtue of his training and expertise, is given the right to de-
termine what treatment alternatives are available to the patient.92 "No
ethical principle or law has ever required physicians to offer or accede to
demands for treatments that are futile."93 Even civil malpractice stan-
dards do not require a physician to render useless interventions. 94 More-
over, a physician does not have a legal duty to act contrary to his
conscience. 95 Therefore, because patient autonomy does not give the pa-
tient the right to demand futile treatment, autonomy is not invaded when
the physician withholds treatment on these grounds.
On the contrary, withholding or withdrawing futile treatment furthers
the goals of the patient autonomy movement because administering futile
treatment, in fact, undermines patient autonomy. Offering treatments
known medically to be futile96 erode, if not destroy, the principle of au-
91. John J. Paris et al., Physician's Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby
L, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1012, 1013 (1990). See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D.,
Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Pa-
dent Relationship, 10 J. CorrEmp. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 47 (1993) (providing that "the
physician-patient relationship is a moral equation with rights and obligations on both sides
and that it must be balanced so that physicians and patients act beneficently toward each
other while respecting each other's autonomy").
92. Paris et al., supra note 91, at 1013. The physician, not the patient, is entrusted with
the professional responsibility to recommend a course of action-this being formulated
once all possibilities are sorted out and all pros and cons weighed. Id It would be a
misguided attempt to respect or validate autonomy by shifting this responsibility to the
patient. Id The ultimate recommendations made by the doctor may be accepted or re-
jected by the patient or his family. Id. They are not free, however, to design treatment or
direct the physician to provide it. Id
93. Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 950. However, Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), dictates that a patient's assessment of the risks and benefits sets
the standard, rather than the prevailing medical criterion, and Lane v. Candura, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978), dictates that a patient has the right to accept or reject a
proposed "treatment the physician judges to be futile or harmful." Paris et al., supra note
91, at 1014. See generally SMrmi, supra note 79, at Ch. 4 (dealing with informal
decisionmaking).
94. Grant, supra note 8, at 332. The physician's duty is to use reasonable medical
judgment when determining whether or not to prescribe a particular treatment. Id.
95. Paris et al., supra note 91, at 1014. "[T]here is nothing in the law which would
justify compelling medical professionals.., to take active measures which are contrary to
their view of their ethical duty toward their patients." Id. (citing Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (Mass. 1986)).
96. There is no ethical obligation to offer diagnostic or therapeutic procedures if they
are determined to be futile. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA
1868, 1868 (1991). Thus, a decision to discontinue treatment, even though made with full
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tonomy of self-determination because use of such interventions invites a
level of hope and raises false expectations of recovery. 97 Indeed, "[s]uch
offers send a mixed message, implying a real choice when none exists."
98
Deception of this sort distorts the patient's perspective and deprives him
of the opportunity to make informed decisions. Thus, the doctrine of fu-
tility and patient autonomy share the same goals of giving the patient
reasonable control over his treatment. A patient will have the right to
refuse any treatment offered, but that right does not extend so far as to
require the physician to yield to demands for treatments that are futile.
By withholding futile treatment, the physician is showing respect for the
patient by being honest about the chances of recovery and the futility of
providing a given treatment.
Some may contend that a patient or his family has a greater right to
demand that treatment be continued once the physician has begun such
treatment. The mere fact that a physician has begun treatment, however,
does not obligate the physician to continue to administer that treatment
once it becomes apparent that the treatment is futile. 99 Patients and their
families alike cannot successfully argue for the continuation of such treat-
ment."° Even if a patient and his family could justify such a demand on a
knowledge and a knowing intent that the patient will most certainly die will not be recog-
nized as an "unlawful failure to perform a legal duty." Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 1022 (1983). Standards of good medical practice authorize the discontinu-
ance of therapies regarded as useless. Id. at 1018. The Barber court found "the focal point
of [such] decision[s] should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to
cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of the biological
vegetative existence." Id. at 1019 (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J.), cert
denied sub nom. Gofger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).
In the case of In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978), the Appeals
Court of Massachusetts held that the physicians attending Shirley Dinnerstein had not ex-
ceeded their professional authority by writing, unilaterally, a DNR on her chart. Id. at 139.
Both the futility of CPR and the appropriateness of the DNR order were appropriate
measures for an irreversible and terminally ill patient. Id. Interestingly, the court stated
that "[c]ardiopulmonary resuscitation is not indicated in certain situations, such as in cases
of terminal irreversible illness where death is not unexpected or where prolonged cardiac
arrest dictates the futility of resuscitation efforts. Resuscitation in these circumstances may
represent a positive violation of an individual's right to die with dignity." Id. at 139 n.10.
97. Stell, supra note 3, at 493.
98. Youngner, supra note 78, at 1295.
99. According to Schneiderman:
A futile action is one that cannot achieve the goals of the action, no matter how
often repeated. The likelihood of failure may be predictable because it is inher-
ent in the nature of the action proposed, and it may become immediately obvious
or may become apparent only after many failed attempts.
Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 950.
100. Id. at 953.
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reliance theory, physicians would simply find other reasons for not ad-
ministering the treatment in the first place.'' This would frustrate,
rather than further, the goals of patient autonomy because physicians
would be depriving patients of treatment to which they are rightly
entitled.
VI. THE DUTY NOT TO ADMINISTER FUTILE TREATMENT
Jecker and Schneiderman offer three reasons why physicians should
have a duty not to provide futile treatment.10 2 The authors first argue
that if it were an option, rather than a duty, physicians could use the term
"as a subterfuge for rationing, cost containment, or refusals to treat vul-
nerable patients."' 1 3 If each physician was given the discretion to provide
treatment deemed to be futile, patients with the means--either independ-
ent wealth or superior insurance--could bypass the doctrine of futility by
merely changing physicians. This would drastically limit its effect by rele-
gating it to a device for depriving treatment for those who cannot afford
it.
It is next argued that since the public looks to the medical profession to
set medical standards, making ad hoc assessments of futility by individual
physicians rather than enforcing objective criteria developed by the medi-
cal profession would be an abdication of professional responsibility. 104 A
substantial burden must be placed on the medical profession to take ac-
tion in order to preserve its stature and credibility by mandating uniform
treatment for all patients in a given condition.
Lastly, it is maintained that offering futile treatment exploits the pub-
lic's fear of death and exaggerates the results that medicine and science
101. Stell, supra note 3, at 487-88. If such reliance was acceptable, it is likely that health
care providers would fight to characterize such care as a priori futile. Id. at 483. "If physi-
cians cannot terminate trial therapy for failure to achieve hoped for effects, they will have a
reason to refrain from offering it." Id
102. Medical Futility, supra note 1, at 155.
103. Id Even before reaching a classification of futility, a new study of elderly persons
surviving heart attacks shows conclusively that many of these victims do not receive poten-
tially lifesaving treatments such as clot-busting drugs and blood thinners, and some are not
even told to stop smoking. Edward F. Ellerbeck et al., Quality of Care for Medicare Pa-
tients with Acute Myocardial Infarction, 273 JAMA 1509, 1512 (1995). The possible rea-
sons for this policy include the complexity of treating heart disease in the elderly and a lack
of oversight in hospitals. Elderly patients tend to have a variety of conditions which often
complicate decisionmaking about appropriate therapy-even though there are acceptable
standards for heart attack treatment.
104. Medical Futility, supra note 1, at 155.
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can achieve.'05 This leads to false expectations and inevitable disappoint-
ment, which in turn, undermines the public's confidence. While these ar-
guments support the proposition that physicians should have an
affirmative duty not to administer futile treatment, more compelling argu-
ments can be found. This paper will consider these more compelling ar-
guments in its discussion of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 10
6
A. Pain Management or Patient Preference
The argument that efforts should always be undertaken to eliminate
pain or other symptoms of human suffering, rather than the person exhib-
iting them, 07 completely ignores the principle of autonomy or self-deter-
mination. Pain management, from a communitarian standpoint, may
salve the conscience of the health care provider by forestalling, or per-
haps, dispelling the need to even consider euthanasia'0--instead, al-
lowing time to take its course passively. From the competent patient's
standpoint, however, pain management ignores his moral and legal
right-acting for whatever purposes are clear to him-to end his life with
a semblance of dignity. 09
While patient pain may be managed effectively today, what occurs
when this is merely palliative and the disease that gave rise to the pain
continues its malignant progression toward terminality?" 0 What if, as a
105. 1l
106. See discussion infra part VIII.
107. See Margaret A. Somerville, The Song of Death: The Lyrics of Euthanasia, 9 J.
CoNTrMp. HEALTH L. & PoL'y 1, 74 (1993).
108. Nevertheless, it has been consistently held that the alleviation of pain by medicine
or surgery does not constitute euthanasia even if the afflicted patient's life is shortened
because such a shortening occurs accidentally as an unforeseen result of the pain manage-
ment. BENEDIcr M. AsHLEY & KEVIN D. O'RouRKE, HEALTHCARE Emics: A THzo-
LOGICAL ANALYSiS 386 (1989).
109. George P. Smith, H, All's Well That Ends Welk Toward a Policy of Assisted Ra-
tional Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 275,282,
419 (1989). When the dying process is charged as irreversible, the balance between mini-
mizing pain and suffering and potentially hastening death should be struck clearly in favor
of pain relief-with the proper dose of medication sufficient to relieve pain being given
even to the point of unconsciousness. See generally Sidney H. Wanzer, M.D. et al., The
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844
(1989) (recommending an "aggressive use of pain-relieving substances ... even when such
use may result in shortened life").
110. It has been submitted that for pain and suffering to serve as a valid basis for eutha-
nasia, three conditions must exist: (1) there must be a present level of pain and suffering;
(2) this pain and suffering must be decisive in determining whether a particular life has a
sufficient level of value to be worth living; and (3) the actual pain and suffering are present
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consequence of the reduction in pain, an individual becomes exceedingly
debilitated and his overall quality of functional existence becomes low or
even worthless because of the consequent restrictions or reductions in
lifestyle and the utter dependence upon others for daily life assistance?
Are individual patient preferences, recognized as futile by all reasonably
objective medical standards, to be subsumed under a contrived medical
mandate of sanctified purposefulness?11' Whose values and preferences
should be given priority-the individual patient's or those of the medical
community?
B. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is closely related to the principle of
medical futility. Proportionality recognizes that overuse, as well as un-
deruse, of medical treatment and advanced life extending technologies
may create an unreasonable burden where the harm and suffering in-
flicted by such a modality of treatment may be disproportionate to any
realistic benefit to be derived from it." 2 When this happens, it is recog-
nized that there is no obligation to provide specific treatment."
3
Proportionality is relatively easy to state and visualize as a cost-benefit
theory where costs are balanced against benefits. 114 In practice, however,
seeking to quantify both factors in the balancing equation is quite diffi-
cult. It is generally thought that this principle can be actualized or struc-
tured with considerable less difficulty and more precision through the use
of advanced medical directives." 5 Sadly, experience has shown popular
and widespread use of such directives to be wanting.
116
to such a degree of intensity that euthanasia is warranted. EIKE-HENNER W. KLUGE, THE
ETHICS OF DELMERATE DEATH 40 (1981). For a competent patient, it would conclusively
appear to be within his own power to test or validate these conditions. See id. For an
incompetent patient, the proxy or surrogate decisionmaker would wish to avail himself of
either a best interests or substituted judgment test in order to determine whether these
three conditions are met. Id.; see also Steven J. Wolhandler, Note, Voluntary Active Eutha-
nasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv.
363 (1984) (arguing that the constitutional right to privacy applies to persons who assist
mentally competent terminally ill patients commit suicide).
111. See HELGA KUHSE, THE SANCTrTY-oF-LIFE DocrRIuNE IN MEDICINE (1987) (argu-
ing that quality of life is a more realistic and compassionate medical standard than one
enshrining all life regardless of the level of functioning sapience).
112. Somerville, supra note 107, at 62.
113. Id.
114. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
228-34 (3d ed. 1989).
115. Somerville, supra note 107, at 62.
116. Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living
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VII. AN ETHICAL CONSTRUCT FOR DECISIONMAKING
When does treatment become futile? Stated otherwise, when does the
futility of existence become so obvious that sustaining it becomes useless
or, indeed, of no socio-legal, philosophical, ethical, or religious "value"?
The concepts of ordinary versus extraordinary lifesaving treatment
must be recognized as highly relative or situational-not only as to time
and locale, but also in their application to individual cases."1 7 Indeed,
both of these concepts have the ultimate effect of serving as value judg-
ments which determine whether a given modality of treatment poses an
undue hardship on the patient or provides positive hope for a direct and
positive benefit. Accordingly, if a particular mode of either medical or
surgical intervention imposes either too great a burden on the patient, or
offers no reasonable hope of beneficial recovery, such treatment could be
classified as extraordinary, and thus, nonobligatory.'1 8 This determina-
tion is essentially a quality of life statement; in reaching it, either know-
ingly or unknowingly, a substituted judgment is made that if the proxy
decisionmaker were in a similar situation to the patient, he would (or
would not) wish to survive in such a state of impairment.1 19 Alterna-
tively, a best interests standard could be utilized with the central question
being: What course of action is in the patient's best interests? 2 '
The basic ethical goals of man should be to respect, safeguard, and ad-
vance individual autonomy, seek equity and justice in dealing with one
another, and undertake beneficent actions which minimize human suffer-
ing and seek to actualize the social utility of the purposes of life.' 2 ' From
a Judeo-Christian perspective, the meaning of life is tied to two inextrica-
ble components of love: love of God and love of thy neighbor-for it is
through love of others that God is, in turn, recognized and loved."2
Under this interpretation, the very meaning of life is to be found in
Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VLL. L. REv. 103, 105, 105 n.5 (1993); James
Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 211, 211 n.122 (1993).
117. RICHARD A. McCoRimcK, S.J., NoTEs ON MORAL THEOLOGY 1965 THROUGH
1980 at 565 (1981); see also SraTi, supra note 9, at 89 ("Because a 'good' death is now
quite improbable for most, it is understandable that a majority of individuals, when asked
the manner in which death would be preferable, reply that a death without warning (as
with an accident) is their choice.").
118. McCoRw cc, supra note 117, at 565.
119. See BEAUCHAMP & CH.DREss, supra note 114, at 171-73.
120. Id
121. See SmuHn, supra note 79, at 48-49; Smith, supra note 109, at 346-47.
122. Richard McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, in
How BRAVE A NEW WORLD? 346, 346 (Richard McCormick ed., 1981).
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human relationships and the qualities of respect, concern, compassion,
and justice that support these associations or relationships.123
A. Social Justice
Under the theory of social justice, each individual is recognized as hav-
ing an equal opportunity to maximize his potential. A point may be
reached, however, where maintenance of an individual defies the very
concepts of humanitarianism and justice. Accordingly, when an individ-
ual's medical condition reaches a level where it represents a complete
negation of those qualities associated with being a human and maintain-
ing a "relational-potential"124 with others, the best and most reasonably
prudent decision regarding treatment would be that it not be undertaken
or that it be withdrawn and only palliative care be administered. 25 When
maintenance of life means the prolongation of pain, with little or no
chance of a real or sustainable level of qualitative recovery, there is no
opportunity to grasp or seek the overall meaning of life or "relational-
potential," or to seek "growth in love of God and neighbor" through con-
tinued human relationships. At this point, such actions should be recog-
nized as being futile and cease.126
In attempting to structure an ethical construct for decisionmaking in
critical at-risk cases, a balancing test should be utilized that weighs the
gravity of the harm in allowing lifesaving actions versus the utility of the
benefits stemming from the actions. Accordingly, the gravity of the harm
would be assessed in terms of not only social and economic costs that
might induce serious financial hardships to all members of the primary or
afflicted interest group (e.g., the family), but the religious, philosophical
and ethical "costs" (or compromises) as well. The utility of the benefits
would be measured in terms of an evaluation of the positive conse-
quences that flow to the threatened individual and to society.127 In truth,
then, this balancing test seeks to arrive at a cost-effective decision
through a cost-benefit analysis.
128
In order to strengthen and add substance to the balancing test, a
number of specific factors may be considered or utilized. Indeed, the late
123. Itt
124. Id at 348-49.
125. See SMiTH, supra note 9, at 173; see also Schneiderman et al., supra note 24, at 952
(stating that no patient has a right to be sustained in a vegetative state).
126. McCormick, supra note 122, at 347.
127. Smith, supra note 40, at 711.
128. Ia. at 734.
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Dr. Joseph Fletcher posited a number of such factors that he termed, al-
ternatively, as qualities or indicators of humanhood. 129 The central most
factor to be considered in any balancing equation is whether the at-risk
patient has a functioning cerebral cortex-for without it one is "nonexis-
tent" and an object rather than subject.130 Minimal intelligence combines
with rationality to build self-awareness and self-control, as well as an abil-
ity to be emotive and intuitive. Other factors of importance include: time
consciousness, a sense of futurity tied to a theological assertion, a sense of
the past, the ability to display curiosity instead of indifference, changea-
bility, a capability to relate to others, compassion or an ability to express
concern for others, an ability to communicate, the ability to be idi-
omorphous or distinctive, and the ability to assert control in life-directing
situations and not display utter helplessness.'
31
Together, the Fletcher indicators present a test of humanhood which is
shaped by the exigencies of each situation. As such, these factors are
shaped or even controlled by a situational ethic which flexibly adapts to
each individual problem instead of being directed uniformly by a rigid
and unyielding a priori ethical standard. Driven by a case-by-case meth-
odology, the boundaries of the situation ethic are incapable of absolute
determination. Yet, the basic norm used in decisionmaking will be love,
or simply, human compassion.' 32 Some of the indicators of humanhood
may have greater or lesser significance depending upon the diagnosis and
prognosis of each case and the balance sought to be struck. For example,
some patients and their families might well make trade-offs, desiring to
place greater value and emphasis on self-control over a sense of the past
and an ability to be emotive and intuitive. Other patients and families
may value an ability to communicate over compassion and the ability to
express concern for others. In employing the reasonableness standard as
the linchpin in any ultimate medical decision regarding the continuation
of medical treatment or the recognition that such would be medically fu-
tile, two primary questions under the ethical construct for decisionmaking
will be proposed here: (1) Whether the medically at-risk individual pos-
sesses a real likelihood of sustaining a "relational-potential" with others?;
and (2) Whether the present or proposed course of medical treatment not
only minimizes suffering, but also seeks to maximize the potential utility
129. Joseph Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, HAsrxnos
CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 1.
130. See id. at 1.
131. 1d& at 1-3.
132. Smith, supra note 40, at 734-35.
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of a life that functions at qualitative levels of cognition?' 33
VIII. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT: A MEDICO-LEGAL REVISION
A. The Historical Development
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits cruel and unu-
sual punishment being administered to prisoners." 4 This prohibition
originated in the Magna Carta, was carried through in the English Decla-
ration of Rights of 1688, and was later adopted as part of the Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution.'3 5 While the Eighth Amend-
ment has been used only in the context of criminal incarceration, it has
contemporary and expanded relevance to the issue of determining
whether providing medically futile treatment results in cruel and unusual
punishment to a patient.
Historically, a prisoner did not have rights and was considered a "slave
of the state."' 3 6 This lack of liberty is analogous to the traditional doctor-
133. Id at 740. Interestingly, in a recent Washington case, while a type of "relational
potential" could probably have been sustained, the only reasonable way to minimize suf-
fering for three competent adults in the terminal phases of cancer, AIDS, and emphysema
was through assisted suicide. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454,
1456-57 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 62 F.3d 299
(9th Cir. 1995). In spite of state legislative prohibition against assisted suicide, a federal
district court ruled, in a case of first impression, that such a prohibition was violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause because the constitutionally protected liberty
interest guaranteed all citizens a right to make profoundly personal decisions which natu-
rally included the right to die. Id. at 1456. Two United States Supreme Court decisions
were cited as controlling authority in the district court's determination: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909 (1994) and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). ld. at 1459, 1461. On March 9, 1995, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and acknowl-
edged that while the right of privacy may encompass freedom from unwanted medical
intervention, it does not include a right to have assistance from a second person. Compas-
sion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 597.
134. "Excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
135. Michael C. Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison
Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REv. 921, 925 (1992).
136. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). It is interesting to
note that the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, enacted six years prior to
this decision, provides that slavery "as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted" is an exception to the ban on slavery. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII.. See
generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The Orig-
inal Meaning, 57 CAL. L. RFv. 839 (1969) (comparing the intent of the prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment found in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution).
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patient relationship wherein patients acquiesced to the prescribed treat-
ment and had little recourse if they disagreed with their doctor. Initially,
the Eighth Amendment served only to bar "torture and other barbarous
methods of execution." '137 This is similar to the view that the doctrine of
futility should be used only to prevent treatment that can harm the pa-
tient. The early interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and this limited
use of futility do not sufficiently protect prisoners and patients.
Over a span of ninety-five years, the Supreme Court expanded protec-
tion for prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.' 38 As early as 1890, the
United States Supreme Court held in the case of In re Kemmler,139 that
prisoners could not be subjected to punishment which subjected them to
"torture or a lingering death.' 140 Twenty years later, the Court declared
that the Eighth Amendment implies protection from "inhuman and
barbarious, torture and the like,'' or actions "so cruel as to shock the
conscience and reason of men.""14 In 1958, Chief Justice Earl Warren,
writing for the plurality in Trop v. Dulles,143 presented a contemporary
interpretive gloss by stating that the relevance of the Eighth Amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
137. Robin Terry, Note, Constitutional Law-Prisoners' Rights-Recognition that In-
voluntary Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke May Constitute Cruel and Unusual
Punishment-Avery v. Powell, 11 CANPBELL L. REv. 363, 366 (1989). See generally Note,
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and The Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV.
L. RFv. 635 (1966) (analyzing judicial influence on federal and state criminal law via inter-
pretation of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause).
138. Id. Arguably, from an international law perspective, the extended administration
of futile medical treatment comes within the meaning of The United Nation's Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment-with
torture being defined as "any act, causing severe mental or physical pain or suffering, in-
tentionally inflicted upon a person." Peter van W. Magee, Note, The United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment: The Bush Administration's Stance on Torture, 25 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. &
ECON. 807, 817 (1992) (citing G.A. Res., 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., art. 1, Supp. No.
51, at 197, U.N. Doe A/39/51 (1984)). Such actions would, arguably, be violative of the
United Nation's Declaration on Human Rights for they would rob the dying patient of the
"inherent dignity" granted to "all members of the human. family." Id. (quoting G.A. Res.
217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
For an abbreviated analysis of the role of major international human rights instruments
in shaping an argument for a right to die with dignity, see Jordan J. Paust, The Human
Right to Die with Dignity: A Policy-Oriented Essay, 17 HuMAN RIGHTS Q. 463, 476-79
(1995).
139. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
140. Id. at 447.
141. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
142. Id. at 356 (citations omitted).
143. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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the progress of a maturing society.""' It had been held previously that
acts which shock the general conscience or are thought to be intolerable
to notions of fairness were violative of the Eight Amendment's
guarantees.'
45
Twentieth century court holdings have sought to restrict the length and
character of sentences under the Eighth Amendment. 46 With the case of
Wilson v. Seiter 47 in 1991, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the major-
ity, sought to structure a two-part inquiry for challenges to the Eighth
Amendment: (1) there must be an objective inquiry into the "serious-
ness" of the alleged conduct or omission; and (2) there must be a subjec-
tive inquiry into the state of mind of the responsible official charged with
violating Eighth Amendment protections.' 48 The baseline standard for
the objective inquiry is to be the "minimal civilized measure of life's ne-
cessities." 49 More specifically, on the issue of the standard of medical
care to be provided within a prison, the court has required petitioners to
allege and prove that acts or omissions are sufficiently harmful to show a
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs' 5°-the level of indiffer-
ence being of such a degree that offends evolving standards of decency.
B. Contemporary Medico Legal Applications
Several factors dictate that administering futile treatment is "cruel and
unusual" within society's evolving standards of decency. If a physician
treats a patient when the physician knows that such treatment is futile,
the physician implies that there is a possibility, if not a likelihood, that
such treatment will be effective. In this case, the physician is knowingly
deceiving the patient by offering the patient and his family false expecta-
tions of recovery. This deception clearly violates the principle of self-
determination and autonomy for the patient himself.
The primary obligation of health care providers is: "Do no harm."''
Thus, physicians must minimize or prevent mental and physical suffering
because this is harmful to patients. Physicians must endeavor to demon-
144. I. at 101.
145. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Blakey v. Sheriff of Al-
bemarle County, 370 F. Supp. 814, 816 (W.D. Va. 1974).
146. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
147. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
148. Id. at 296-301.
149. Id. at 298 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
150. Friedman, supra note 135, at 929.
151. Paris et al., supra note 91, at 1014.
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strate levels of compassion which counter an all too pervasive indiffer-
ence within the medical profession to allow terminally ill patients to die
lingering deaths-a manner which defies the minimally civilized goal of
allowing all individuals to die with humaneness and dignity. What real
value is there to pain management if death is imminent and the added
days of life provided are of inferior quality?
152
Administering futile treatment ignores this primary obligation of a
health care provider by exposing the patient to additional risks of that
treatment. If a physician prescribed a course of treatment knowing that it
was futile, he would be needlessly exposing the patient to additional risks
associated with the treatment such as infection or adverse reactions.
Even if the futile treatment did not adversely affect the patient, the mere
exposure to the risk is cruel. Moreover, some interventions, such as CPR,
inflict severe physical trauma. 153 Administering CPR when there is no
medically reasonable chance that the patient will recover from the under-
lying illness amounts to physical torture.154 Physicians should be under a
152. See generally George P. Smith, II, Reviving the Swan, Extending the Curse of Me-
thuselah or Adhering to the Kevorkian Ethic?, 2 CAMBRIDE Q. HEALTHCARE ETmICS 49
(1993); George P. Smith, II, Death be Not Proud: Medica4 Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in
Resource Allocation, 3 J. CoNramP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1987).
153. The physical dangers of CPR are not widely known to the public. "Ribs can be
broken, the trachea damaged, and not uncommonly the brain never completely recovers
from oxygen deprivation." Medical Futility, supra note 1, at 154.
According to a study undertaken at 5 hospitals of more than 2,600 patients hospitalized
with 1 of 9 various life threatening conditions (eg., coma, acute respiratory failure, multi-
ple organ system failure with sepsis or malignancy, chronic obstructive lung disease, con-
gestive heart failure, cirrhosis, metastic colon cancer, or nonsmall cell lung cancer) where
life expectancy averaged less than 6 months, results showed significant skepticism by physi-
cians toward their patient's CPR wishes. Joan M. Teno et al., Preferences for Cardiopulmo-
nary Resuscitation: Physician-Patient Agreement and Hospital Resource Use, 10 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 179 (1995). Specifically, in the nearly one out of three cases, the doctor's
perception of the patient's preference not to have CPR was at odds with the doctor's per-
ception. Id. at 182. This misunderstanding not only resulted in the higher use of hospital
beds, ventilators, and CPR, but prolonged dying for those patients who preferred not to be
given "extraordinary" lifesaving measures. Id at 183-85. In those cases where the patient
preference for not being resuscitated was accepted by the physician, estimated hospital
costs were $20,527 per case. Id at 182. In contrast, where the physician misunderstood or
was uncertain about a patient's wish not to commence CPR, costs accelerated to more than
$26,500. Id
154. In 1986, the California Court of Appeal held that a 28 year-old woman, Elizabeth
Bouvia, suffering from cerebral palsy, completely bedridden and immobile, in continued
pain, and suffering from degenerative arthritis was "imprisoned" lying "physically helpless
subject to ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by her
helplessness." Bouvia v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (1986) (emphasis added).
Writing for the majority, Justice Beach concluded, "We cannot conceive it to be the policy
of the State to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone." Id
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duty not to administer futile treatment because, by doing so, they are
inflicting "cruel and unusual punishment" on patients and their families.
It is similarly "cruel and unusual punishment" to sustain patients who
exist in a PVS. This is equivalent to giving a life sentence to an innocent
person. The remedy for persons in a PVS, however, is not an executive
pardon, but rather a death sentence (i.e., the withdrawal of treatment that
merely maintains the unconscious nonsapient condition). When a person
is diagnosed as being in a PVS, there is an agreement among physicians
that such a condition is not "living" and that preservation of "life" in that
state is not a proper goal for medicine.15 This is supported by the "tradi-
tional and modem view that... expert physician[s] should not prescribe
therapies which cannot restore health to a dying person,"'156 and that all
medical decisionmaking should have as its goal the benefit of the human
person. 57 Clearly, physicians have no duty to preserve mere biological
"existence" per se.158
C. Wanton Acts Freakishly Imposed
The Supreme Court has recognized that "death as a punishment is
unique in its severity and irrevocability.' 159 Thus, in 1976, the Court held
in Gregg v. Georgia160 that "'[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death.., to be ... wantonly
and... freakishly imposed.""'161 All too often, as a "benefit" of advances
in medical technology, the prolongation of nonsapient "life" becomes
truly a kind of unjust punishment which may realistically be viewed as
grossly disproportionate to the ideal of a good and dignified death that all
persons seek.162 Sadly, this extension of life is imposed and dictated all
too frequently under freakish conditions in a medical hospital, which for
all intents and purposes, is but little more than a prison. The futile main-
tenance of "life" under artificial conditions of this nature, more often
155. For many physicians, preserving "life" in a vegetative state when all possibility of
restoring consciousness is extinguished, has never been regarded as a fundamental goal of
sound medical. practice. Cranford & Gostin, supra note 66, at 308.
156. Miles, supra note 18, at 311.
157. Grant, supra note 8, at 331.
158. Stell, supra note 3, at 489.
159. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (citations omitted).
160. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
161. Id. at 188 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-310 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
162. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that failure to provide
adequate treatment to a prisoner constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment).
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than not, offends human dignity and "transgresses . . . civilized stan-
dard[s] [of] humanity [and] decency.
'163
While technology has given health care professionals vast ability to pre-
serve the existence of life, the ability to preserve and restore cognitive,
sapient life pales in comparison."6 Ignoring the considerations of the lat-
ter would mean that there is "no real difference between medicine and
horticulture.' '165 Sustaining persons in a PVS and other terminal condi-
tions is worse than horticulture. It is cruel to the patient because it denies
the patient the right to die with dignity and cruel to the family because of
the emotional and financial drain. 66
IX. CONCLUSION
Dying is, "[b]y and large, a messy business."'167 It is both "ugly and
dirty" in a world that is intolerant of such qualities. 68 Perhaps the only
true dignity found within the occurrence of death is a full appreciation of
163. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1973) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
164. Stell, supra note 3, at 489.
165. Id.
166. If physicians were under a duty to administer futile treatment, the family could
intervene and, out of a sense of guilt, demand that "everything be done." Boozang, supra
note 66, at 73 n.277 (quoting PAUL RAMsEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN
MEDICAL ETmics 143 (1970)). "Out of their guilt, members of the family are likely-at
long last-to require that everything possible be done for the hopelessly ill and the dying
loved one." Id.
In a decision issued by the Supreme Court of Canada on September 30, 1993, it was held
that a 42 year-old woman suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's dis-
ease) could not, under Canadian law, have medical assistance to install an intravenous line
containing an effective agent that, at the appropriate time, could be activated by the peti-
tioner to end her life. Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen. of Can., 3 S.C.R. 519, 520 (Can. 1993).
Among the arguments made to sustain the appeal from the lower court's adverse finding
was that Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms accorded all citizens a
right not to be subject to any cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 522. While conceding
"treatment" by the state may include acts other than those of a penal or quasi-penal na-
ture, Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, held that a state prohibition (as here, against
assisted suicide) could not constitute "treatment" within the context of Section 12 of the
Charter. Id. In order for the state action to constitute "treatment," it must encompass an
active state process "involving an exercise of state control over the individual." hi Simply
because a particular state prohibition impacts negatively upon an individual and causes
suffering, does not subject such a person to "treatment" by the state. "The starving person
who is prohibited by threat of criminal sanction from 'stealing a mouthful of bread' is
likewise not subjected to 'treatment' within the meaning of [Section] 12 ...." Id. at 611-12.
167. S-mRwm B. NuLAND, How WE Din: REFLEcrONS ON Ln 's FINAL CHAPTER 142
(1994).
168. Id. at 255.
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the life that precedes it.
169
The management of death can surely be both more humane and more
efficient when the principle of medical utility is harmonized with patient
autonomy. By defining medical utility as "'the maximization of the wel-
fare of patients in need of treatment,""170 it is clear that criteria are essen-
tial in determining, in a fair and equitable manner, who will receive and
benefit from an initial use or continuation of scarce medical resources,
and conversely, who will not. Utilitarianism, then, in choosing which
course of action to follow will evaluate those actions which produce the
greatest benefit for the greatest number of individuals.171 Social utility is
used as an integral part of the balancing equation. Herein lies the prob-
lem: How can the needs and prognosis of a particular patient be balanced
against the needs of society? Stated otherwise, how can physicians serve
two masters, society and patients, in determining the type and amount of
medical care?
172
The principle of medical futility, delineated and tested in the manner
proposed in this Article, can serve as a catalyst for public action, accept-
ance, or both.'73 Furthermore, medical futility can serve as the dominant
vector of force in validating the very essence of utility, and thus, resolve
the inherent conflict between patient needs and greater societal goals.
The fact that there is a pressing national need for a clear, objective, and
practical definition of futility is without doubt. Yet, the reality of the situ-
ation dictates that regardless of the definition settled upon, a debate be-
tween and among the medical professionals and social policy makers will
inevitably arise. The public, because of its inherent lack of sophistication
in this area, will depend upon both groups to educate them and win their
acceptance. To fail in this mission means, simply, an increase in suits for
medical malpractice by uninformed patients and their families or proxy
decisionmakers.
Once defined criteria for medical futility are accepted by health care
169. It at 242.
170. Amy Marie Haddad, Ethical Issues in Health Care Rationing, in HEALTH CARE
RATiONING: DILEMMA AND PARADOX 11, 22 (Kathleen Kelly ed., 1994) (quoting
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 114).
171. Id.; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 114, at 33 (providing an exam-
ple of a utilitarian act).
172. See generally Haddad, supra note 170, at 11 (exploring "ethical implications of
rationing for nursing"); Tomlinson & Czlonka, supra note 22, at 33-35 (providing a model
futility policy).
173. See Terese Hudson, Are Futile-Care Policies the Answer?, Hosps. & HEALTH NET-
woams, Feb. 24, 1994, at 26, 32.
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providers and the public which they serve, this restructured principle af-
fords the ideal construct for determining the utilitarian balance between
patient and majoritarian preferences, wants, or needs. It achieves this by
institutionalizing a balancing point that distinguishes the medical actions
agreed upon as useful, reasonable, or promotive of restorative quality
under particular circumstances with various patient profiles, and those
actions not beneficial to patients or economically feasible for society to
undertake. In a real way, then, these criteria act as a socio-legal-ethical-
medico-economic triage, providing various medical and surgical interven-
tions not regarded as reasonable for use by certain patients with profiles
which show that there is no assurance of a sustained level of qualitative
rehabilitation or salvageability.
174
Upon the acceptance or adoption of guidelines for determining futility,
ideally along the lines of those proposed by Schneiderman and Jecker, a
three-tiered decisional structure has been proposed as a mechanism for
determining whether a given treatment for a given patient falls within the
scope of these guidelines. Accordingly, the treating physician would be
given the primary responsibility for making the decision to withdraw or
withhold treatment on the grounds of futility. Although he would be
under a duty not to prescribe treatment deemed futile by him, he would
be obliged to inform the patient, and if necessary, the family of this deci-
sion and its rationale. This would provide the patient and family a basis
for an "appeal" to the hospital ethics committee, if such course were
elected.'75 Any further appeal from an adverse finding by the committee
would be to the courts, where a limited review of the reasonableness of
the decision to withdraw or withhold treatment would be undertaken.
Absent both a redefinition of death176 to include a PVS and
174. The definition of "reasonableness should turn on thd question whether the patient
retains any capacity to experience and enjoy life. The treatment should provide a benefit
to the patient as a responsive, or minimally interactive human being, not as a constellation
of bodily systems kept running by mechanical means." Rhoden, supra note 13, at 437. See
generally George P. Smith, II, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CoNTrrMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 143 (1985) (discussing health allocation problems and schemes).
175. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 109, at 415 (providing an illustration of whether a pa-
tient could seek assistance from the courts to assert a right to self-determination).
176. See generally Ad Hoe Committee of the Harvard Medical School, A Definition of
Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 JAMA 337 (1968) (defining "irreversible coma
as a new criterion for death"); David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 850 (1986) (examining "the law's approach to death by inquiring into the
legal issues raised by cardiopulmonary, whole brain, and neocortical definitions of death").
In 1991, New Jersey became the first state to enact a statute recognizing a personal
1995]
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anencephaly and a failure to achieve a broad consensus to establish crite-
ria for treatment based upon the extent and duration of neurologic dam-
age, perhaps a less contentious approach to the effort of redefining the
principle of medical futility would be the acceptance of a presumption
that those permanently existing in a vegetative state would not want to be
kept alive for an indefinite period of time. Accepting this presumption
would, in turn, allow a standard of care to be established that would rou-
tinely include a cessation of treatment after a reasonable time. Although
the standard of reasonableness would vary with medical circumstances or
situations, it would be tied with sufficient clarity to a recognition of irre-
versibility. Consistent with this new medico-legal presumption would be
a shift in the burden to those wishing maintenance of a vegetative state to
show that they are acting in accordance with what they know from clear
and convincing evidence to be the wishes of the patient himself."7
Since administering futile medical treatment is tantamount to inflicting
cruel and unusual punishment on the patient and an abridgement of his
rights of self-determination, it is incumbent upon physicians to recognize
that they should accept the imposition of an affirmative legal, profes-
sional, moral, and ethical duty not to prescribe a modality of treatment
that falls clearly within the scope of being considered futile, freakish, and
tortious. The utilitarian value of a revalidated and operative principle of
futility is all too apparent. Let it be used in a reasonable and compassion-
ate manner to end the cruel punishment of terminal and hopeless cases of
"human" existence and, at the same time, hopefully, give rise to an ethic
religious exemption or conscience clause. This statute has the effect of requiring a physi-
cian to declare death upon the basis of cardio-respiratory criteria (Le., cessation of all cir-
culatory and respiratory functions) rather than brain or neurological death in those cases
where he knows or has reason to believe such is consistent with a patient's religious beliefs.
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 6A1-6A8 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); see also Robert S. Olick, Brain
Death, Religious Freedom and Public Policy: New Jersey's Landmark Legislative Initiative,
1 KENNEDY INsT. ETHics J. 275 (1991) (discussing the effect of recent New Jersey
legislation).
177. This was the argument made by Helga Wanglie's husband even though her contin-
ued treatment was futile. Marcia Angell, After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent
Vegetative State, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1534, 1535 (1994); Angell, supra note 10, at 511; see
also Maldonado, supra note 10, at 131 (discussing the medical and bioethical issues in-
volved in the case of In re the Conservatorship of Helga M. Wanglie).
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of palliative care and less to a relentless pursuit of technologies that ex-
tend futility to the point of indecency and inhumaness.
178
178. Dying Young, supra note 20, at 71. A disturbing 5 year study of more than 9,000
acutely ill patients in hospitals with an average life expectancy of 6 months (having 1 or
more illnesses such as coma, colon cancer, congestive heart failure, or respiratory failure)
and the severe processes by which they die, found death for one-third of them was pro-
longed and painful, with heroic treatments such as mechanical ventilation or CPR being
administered routinely even when patients directed these procedures be withheld. The
SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill
Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes
and Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995); Bernard Lo, MD, Improving
Care Near the End of Life: Why Is it So Hard?, 274 JAMA 1634 (1995).
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